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                                                            Abstract
     This study investigates the role of financial structure on the volatility of four asset
prices in Korea.  First, historical development of size, activity and efficiency of financial
structure is investigated and development of non-bank financial institutions analyzed for
the last three decades.  Second, using the concept of bank-based and market-based
financial structure, it is shown that there exists a stable long-run relationship among
financial structure and volatility of real effective exchange rate, money market rate, stock
price, and government bond yield on housing.  Finally, we find that dynamic impact of
financial structure is asymmetric to different financial variables.  This implies that
different transmission mechanisms of monetary policies are necessary to achieve
different policy goals of the economy.  For example, if the policy goal of the monetary
authority is stabilizing the volatility of the money market rate, monetary authority’s
intervention in the banking sector is more efficient than intervening into other sectors of
the financial system.  We report each case using  cointegrating vector and impulse
response function analysis.
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when the first author was an economist at the Development Research Group. We are
grateful to Giovanni Majnoni,  Judith McDonald, S. Kwack  for their very helpful
comments but all remaining errors are our own.
1I. Introduction
 The literature on currency crises has provided a number of suggestions about the
possible influence of financial structure on the volatility of asset prices and capital flows.
There is by now a documented empirical evidence of the relationship between the
financial structure and financial crisis.  While this may provide some indirect insight
about the relationship between asset volatility – interpreted as extreme variations of
prices – and financial structure, a more direct analysis seems to be missing.  Although
finance theory tells us that the linkage between the financial structure of the economy and
the likelihood of financial crises is provided by the volatility of financial and non-
financial assets this intermediate link is still somewhat unexplored.  Stock prices often
double or fall in half in a space of a few years, when there seems to be no concrete reason
why stock prices should have changed at all.  Sometimes speculative prices change
dramatically in a matter of days or even hours.  On 19 October 1987, the day of the worst
crash in U.S. stock market history, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 16 percent of
its value in the space of three hours, from 1.15 p.m. to 4.00 p.m.  Analyses of news
service records show that during that interval of time there was virtually no economic
news except for the news of the stock market drop itself.   Such evidence would seem to
suggest that the source of market volatility is something loosely called "market
psychology," the changing public expectations, attitudes, and theories about the market
(Shiller, 1992).
 In this paper, we examine how the financial structure of an economy, Korea,
affects the asset price volatility of several key financial variables using time-series data.
To measure empirically the financial structure of a country we employ the recently
developed concept of bank-based versus market-based financial structure (Demirguc-
2Kunt and Levine, 1999).   In section II, we describe the development of Korea's financial
structure.  In section III, we investigate the statistical properties of each time series used
in this study and test for a stable long-run relationship among financial structure and
volatility of four financial variables in Korea using Johansen’s conintegration technique.
In section IV, we investigate the dynamic impact of financial structure on the volatility of
four financial variables using the vector-autoregression model.  Conclusions are
presented in section V.
II. The Development of Korea's Financial Structure
 This section will investigate the changes in financial structure and the underlying
regulation, tax, and legal changes that caused them.  The most important policy measure
of government-led economic development in Korea was financial policy (e.g., interest-
rate regulation and policy loans).   The heavy intervention of the Korean government in
the financial system during the 1960s and 1970s is revealed by its discretionary allocation
of funds to target industries through policy loans (credit rationing). This caused
misallocation (overinvestment) of financial resources into the heavy manufacturing and
chemical industries, which led to creditor bankers' losses.  The banking sector suffered
from a lack of competitiveness, an accumulation of non-performing assets, and delays in
liberalization.  Policy loans at preferential interest rates accounted for half of the total
credit offered by domestic financial institutions in 1970s and about 30 percent in the
1980s with the expansion of non-bank financial Institutions (NBFIs, hereafter; Bank of
Korea, 1995).
 In the fifth economic development plan (‘82-’86), the Korean government put
more emphasis on the stability, efficiency, and social equity within the economy,
3believing that a massive misallocation of resources in the heavy manufacturing and
chemical industries could have been avoided if the functioning of the financial system
had been left in the hands of the private sector.  The government tried to improve
efficiency through the promotion of competition and private initiative.  The goals of
financial reform were reducing inefficiency and preventing private rent-seeking and
foreign control of the financial market (Amsden and Euh, 1993).
1. Changes in Financial Structure, Size, Activity and Efficiency in Korea
Among financial institutions, banks provide funds mostly through loans and they
dominated in financial institution borrowings until the 1970s.  Their relative importance
has gradually declined, slipping from 29.2 percent of the market in the first half of the
1970s to 19.2 percent in the first half of the 1990s.  Whereas Table 1 shows that the
market shares of non-banks and securities market increased over the period 1970-74 to
1990-94 from 8.8 percent to 33.2 percent and from 11.1 percent to 27.0 percent
respectively.  The share of deposits held by nonbanks increased from 31.6 percent in
1980 to 67.6 percent in 1995 (see Table 2).
Despite the slow pace of reform, Korea's financial market experienced growth in
overall size and activity.  Korean financial depth increased from 49.4 percent in 1981 to
103.2 percent in 1989 and to 150.0 percent in 1995, mostly due to the growth in the
nonbanking sector.   However, stock market capitalization to GDP grew even more over
this period, from 6 percent to 63.4 percent.  This explains the growth in the stock market's
relative size, which started out at 20 percent in early 1980s, but ended the decade at 90
percent.  During the same period, stock market liquidity and bank credit to the private
sector also increased, leading to an increase in overall activity from 44 percent to 82
4percent of GDP.  However, the growth in stock market liquidity far outweighed that in
bank credit as can be seen from relative activity figures.  Looking at efficiency indicators,
relative efficiency increased whereas overall efficiency fell during the period.  This is
because although stock market turnover increased with liberalization, banking spreads
increased even more.
2. Development of  Non-Bank Financial Institutions
In this section, we will analyze the development of non-bank financial institutions
(NBFIs), their special treatment by law and regulation, their structure and business
activities, their role in stimulating and mobilizing savings, and their contribution to
Korea's economic development
 Many NBFIs were introduced in 1972 in response to the Presidential Emergency
Decree for Economic Stabilization and Growth.  Their numbers and volume of funds
grew significantly during the rapid economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s.  A further
contribution to their rapid growth came from the relatively higher interest rates permitted
to them and the greater degree of autonomy in management they were allowed compared
to traditional banks.  In 1982, requirements for establishing NBFIs were reduced and
consequently twelve short-term finance companies and 57 mutual savings and finance
companies began operations.  During the period 1987 to 1990, five securities trust
companies and eighteen life insurance companies were in operation (Bank of Korea,
1995).
NBFIs can be classified into four categories according to their business activities:
i) development institutions, which consist of the Korea Development Bank, the Export-
Import Bank of Korea, and the Korea Long Term Credit Bank; ii) investment institutions,
which consist of investment and finance companies, merchant banking corporations, and
5securities investment trust companies; iii) savings institutions including trust accounts of
banks, mutual savings and finance companies, credit unions, mutual credit facilities,
community credit cooperatives, and postal savings; and iv) life insurance institutions.
Out of these four categories of NBFIs, investment and life insurance institutions grew
most rapidly during the period 1980-1995.  These NBFIs have contributed significantly
to the stimulation and mobilization of savings since they were able to circumvent the
interest-rate ceilings on both the sources and uses of funds (Koo, 1993).  Table 2 shows
that over the period 1980-1995, the share of loans made by NBFIs increased from 36.7
percent to 57.1 percent.  On the demand side, high real interest rates (due to slowing price
increases in the early 1980s) jeopardized the viability of firms with high financial
leverage. Because of the repressed commercial bank interest rates, corporations not
supported by the government were forced to borrow from NBFIs.  NBFIs evaded the low
interest-rate policy of MOF by requiring compensating balances that borrowers had to
redeposit in the same financial institution, thereby raising the effective interest rates on
the original loans (Bank of Korea, 1995).
3. A Measure of  Financial Structure
The measurement of financial structure in this study draws heavily on the recent
work by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) that derived several findings on the
relationship between financial structure and per capita income level.  According to their
study, in higher income countries, banks and other financial intermediaries as well as
stock markets and the overall financial system tend to be larger, more active, and more
efficient. In higher income countries insurance companies, pension funds, and other non-
bank financial intermediaries are larger as a share of GDP.
6For practical purposes, we used three variables as indicators of Korea's financial
structure: bank assets to GDP (claims on the private sector by commercial banks to GDP,
BANK); non-banking financial institution’s assets to GDP as a measurement of other
financial institution’s size (NBFI); and stock-market capitalization to GDP as a measure
of stock market development (MK).  Variable definitions are given in the Appendix.
Figure 1 shows the changing pattern of the financial structure in Korea and Table 2
shows the volatility of four financial variables.
III.  The Data and Their Statistical Properties
In this section we define the variables used in this study and test the stationarity of
those variables using two different unit root test procedures.
1. The Data and Their Statistical Properties
 All quarterly data are from the March 1999 issue of the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics, CD-Rom version, and are seasonally adjusted using exponential
smoothing.  Data definitions are found in the Appendix.  A control variable is used to
isolate the effects of structural variables (that are expected to maintain their impact over
the long run) from the short-run effects of policy -- monetary or fiscal -- on the volatility
of each economic variable a la Krumm (1993).  Volatility responds to both real and
monetary variables.  Monetary and fiscal variables are combined into one
macroeconomic control variable, VV, which is defined as the percentage change in
domestic credit over and above the percentage change in GDP, foreign prices, and the
nominal exchange rate.
                                     VV =  DC*  - Y* - Pf* - NE* ,                (1)
7where DC is domestic credit, Y is GDP, Pf is U.S. WPI, NE is the nominal exchange rate
to the U.S. dollar, and * indicates percentage change.
In order to examine the stationarity of each time series, we conducted unit root
tests.  Table 3 reports the results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Paco Goerlich
Tests, which reveal that all series have unit roots.
2. Johansen’s Cointegration Test
Since all variables are non-stationary, we use Johansen's co-integration analysis to
test whether those variables have co-integrating vectors.  Johansen (1988) and Johansen
and Juselius (1990) developed a cointegration test methodology that overcome most of
the problems of the previous two-step approach.
Johansen and Juselius (1990) considered the following general model:
           X t   =  Π1 X t-1 + ...+ Π t-k =X t-k  + v + ε t ===for t=1,….T,                  (2)
where  X t  is a vector of variables ; ε 1……. =ε T are independent and normal errors with zero
mean and covariance matrix Σ;== X t-k, X 0 are fixed; and v is an intercept vector.
Economic time series are often non-stationary and systems such as the above vector-
autoregressive representation (VAR) can be written in the conventional first-difference
form:
============ ∆X t   =  =Γk-i ∆ X t-k-1 + Π  =X t-k  + v + ε t   ,                                                     (3)
where    Γ i     =  =−=(=1− Π 1=− Π 2−=................− Π k)    for i=1,2,……k-1,
and        Π =======− ( 1 - Π 1−=................− Π k).
The only level term in equation  (3) is ΠX t-k.   Thus, only the Π matrix contains
information about the long-run relationship between the variables in the data vector.
There are three possible cases:
81. If the Π=matrix has rank zero then all variables in X are integrated of order one or
higher and the VAR has no long-run properties;
2. If the Π matrix has rank p (i.e., it is of full rank ), the variables in X are stationary; and
3. If Π=matrix has rank r ( 0 < r < p), Π can be decomposed into two distinct (p*r)
matrices α and β such that Π===αβ’.
The third case implies that there are r cointegrating vectors.  The parameters of
the cointegrating vectors are contained in the β matrix.  Therefore  β’X is stationary even
though Xt itself is nonstationary. The=α=matrix gives weights with which the
cointegrating vectors enter each equation of the system. To determine the number of
cointegrating vectors, r, Johansen and Juselius (1990) used two likelihood-ratio tests.
The first test is based on the maximal eigenvalue (λMAX) -- the null hypothesis is that
there are at most r cointegrating vectors against the alternative r+1 cointegrating vectors.
The second test is based on the trace of the stochastic matrix (TRACE) -- the null
hypothesis is that there are at most r cointegrating vectors against the alternative
hypothesis that there are r or more cointegrating vectors.  Two likelihood-ratio tests for
the existence and cointegrating vectors are reported in Table 4.  Johansen’s cointegration
tests are implemented using four lags and for four sets of five variables which include the
volatility, financial structure, and control variables.
Table 5-A shows that the volatility of stock prices has two cointegrating vectors
with the financial structural variables at the 10 percent critical level based on both λmax
and Trace statistics.  One of the cointegrating vectors can be written as follows:
-.058 VSTK  -  1.644 NBFI + 12.22 BANK + .662 MK + 0.018 VV = 0       (6)
9Equation (6) implies that increases in bank assets to GDP and stock market capitalization
to GDP increases the volatility of the stock price.  This finding is consistent with the
impulse response analysis of the vector-autoregression model. The economic implication
of this cointegrating vector is that increase in bank assets (BANK) and stock market
capitalization (MK) destabilize the volatility of stock prices, implying a high sensitivity
of stock prices to financial activities of the economy.  The impulse response function in
Figure 3 confirms this finding.
Table 5-B shows that the volatility of the real effective exchange rate has three
cointegrating vectors with the financial structure variables at the 10 percent critical level
based on both  λmax and Trace statistics.  One of the cointegrating vector scan be written
as follows:
.024 VREX + 2.052 NBFI  - 13.05 BANK  -.723 MK + 0.151 VV = 0       (7).
This cointegrating vector is consistent with the impulse response analysis of the vector-
autoregression model presented in Figures 4-A and 4-B.
Table 5-C shows that the volatility of money-market interest rates has three
cointegrating vectors with the financial structural variables at the 10 percent critical level
based on both  λmax and Trace statistics.  One of the cointegrating vectors can be written
as follows:
-1.138 VMMR  + 4.504 NBFI  -  25.846 BANK –1.285 MK + 0.654 VV = 0.       (8)
This implies that increases in non-bank financial institutions' assets to GDP increase the
volatility of the bond yield, whereas increases in stock market capitalization to GDP
decrease the volatility of money-market rates.  This finding is consistent with the impulse
response analysis of the vector-autoregression model shown in Figures 5-A and 5-C.  The
economic implication of this cointegrating vector is that increases in stock market
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capitalization to GDP and non-bank financial institutions' assets destabilize the volatility
of the money-market rate because their activities are less regulated than other financial
sector.
Table 5-D shows that the volatility of government bond yield has two
cointegrating vectors with the financial structural variables at the 10 percent critical level
based on both  λmax and Trace statistics.  One of the cointegrating vectors can be written
as follows:
-.226 VBOND + 2.543 NBFI  - 16.78 BANK  -.925 MK + 0.188 VV = 0.       (8)
This implies that increases in bank assets to GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP
decrease the volatility of the government bond yield. This finding is consistent with the
impulse response analysis of the vector-autoregression model which is presented in
Figure 6.  The economic implication of this cointegrating vector is that while increases in
bank asset and stock market capitalization stabilize the volatility of the government bond
yield, increases in non-bank financial institutions' assets destabilize the volatility of the
government bond yields because their activities are less regulated.
IV. Dynamic Analysis Using a Vector-Autoregression Model
In this section we use the vector-autoregression model to examine the dynamic
impact of financial structure on the volatility of the financial variables.
1. A Vector-Autoregression Model
We will test the dynamic impact of changing financial structure on the volatility of four
economic variables using the vector-autoregressive model presented in equations (9)
through (13):
VRX = Σ=αi==ΜΚ==+====Σ=αi===ΒΑΝΚ===+===Σ=αi===ΝΒFI  +   Σ=αi==  VV          (9)
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MK  =  Σ=αi= VRX =+==Σ=αi===ΒΑΝΚ===+===Σ=αi===ΝΒFI  +   Σ=αi==  VV         (10)
BANK = Σ=αi==ΜΚ==+==Σ=αi=== VRX ==+====Σ=αi===ΝΒFI   +   Σ=αi==  VV        (11)
ΝΒFI  = Σ=αi==ΜΚ==+===Σ=αi===ΒΑΝΚ===+==Σ=αi===VRX   +   Σ=αi==  VV         (12)
VV =  Σ=αi==ΜΚ====+=====Σ=αi===ΒΑΝΚ===+====Σ=αi==ΝΒFI   +  Σ=αi== VRX,     (13)
where VRX is the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, MK is the amount of
stock market capitalization divided by GDP, BANK is claims on the private sector by
commercial banks, NBFI is the ratio of bank to non-bank financial institutions' assets,
and VV is the macroeconomic policy stance variable to control for the impact of
macroeconomic policies.
2. Impulse Response Function
 The goal of this section is to investigate the dynamic impact of financial
structural variables on the volatility of economic variables. Granger-causality amongst
these variables is examined and the results are reported in Table 4.  Based on these
causality tests and economic theory, the ordering of the variables in the vector-
autoregression is determined. Various different orderings are tried to see the robustness
of the test result.
The dynamic impact of financial structure and macroeconomic policy stance
variables are analyzed through the computation of variance decompositions (VDCs) and
impulse response functions (IRFs) which, in turn, are based on the moving-average
representation of the VAR model and reflect both direct and indirect effects.  In
particular, the VDCs for VREX indicate the percentage of the forecast-error variance in
the VREX accounted by the financial structure and VV.
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3. Dynamic Impact of Financial Structure on Economic Volatility
An optimal lag of four is chosen based on the likelihood-ratio test and the model
is then estimated.  Since different orderings of the variables in the VAR estimation yield
different results, various orderings based on the Granger-causality tests reported in Table
4 were tried.  However, different orderings did not bring about significant differences.
From the impulse response function and variance decomposition of forecast-error
variances, we find the following:
Volatility of the stock price
Impulse response functions show that stock market capitalization (MK) and
private claims of commercial banks (BANK) increase the volatility of the stock prices in
Korea.   Increased stock market capitalization increases the uncertainty of the market and
leads to the increased volatility of stock prices -- this reflects the highly volatile
characteristics of the stock price independent of the financial structure.  Finally, the
macroeconomic policy stance variable has a negative impact on VSTK   The impulse
response functions are shown in Figures 3-A to 3-C.
Table 6-A shows the innovation accountings of the volatility of the stock price.
With the exception the stock price volatility variable itself, BANK plays the most
important role in explaining the variance decomposition of the forecast error variance of
the volatility of the stock price, explaining about 12 percent of the 12-step ahead forecast
error variance.  The stock market capitalization to GDP (MK) variable is next in
importance.  However, the policy stance (VV) and stock market capitalization (MK)
variables explain very little of the forecast-error variance of the volatility of the stock
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price volatility.   Table 6-C shows the variance decomposition of the volatility of the
stock price from one to 48 quarters.
Volatility of real effective exchange rate
The impulse response function shows that stock market capitalization (MK)
increases the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, whereas private claims of
commercial banks to GDP (BANK) destabilize the volatility in Korea.  This can be
explained by the strong restrictions on the foreigners' investments in Korea's stock market
and on most capital flows, which are one of the most important variables affecting
exchange-rate movements.  Impulse response functions are shown in Figures 4-A to 4-C.
In sum, with the exception of the real effective exchange rate itself, stock market
capitalization to GDP plays the most important role in explaining the forecast error
variance of the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, explaining about 12 percent
of the forecast error variance by 8 quarters.  The next most important explanatory
variable is private claims of the banking sector (BANK), explaining about 7 percent by 8
quarters.  However, the policy stance and non-bank financial institutions (NBFI)
variables explain very little of the forecast-error variance of the volatility of the real
effective exchange rate.  Table 6-B shows the variance decomposition of the volatility of
the real effective exchange rate in Korea.
Volatility of the money market rate (VMMR)
Impulse response functions are shown in Figures 5-A to 5-C.  These indicate that
the stock market capitalization to GDP (MK) increases the volatility of the money-market
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rate, while private claims of commercial banks (BANK) decrease the volatility of the
money-market rate. This implies that as a country moves from a bank-based financial
structure to a market-based financial structure, the volatility of the money-market rate
increases.  From the variance decomposition of the forecast error variance of the
volatility of the money-market rate, except volatility of the money market rate itself,
stock market capitalization is playing the most important role, explaining some 22
percent of the forecast error variance in 24 quarters ahead (commercial banks claims on
private sector to GDP (BANK) is the next most important variable).  Both the policy
stance variable (VV) and NBFI have very small roles to play in explaining the forecast-
error variance of the volatility of the stock price volatility.  Table 6-C shows the variance
decomposition of the volatility of the money-market rate from one to 24 quarters.
Volatility of the Government Bond Yield on Housing
Both the stock market capitalization to GDP (MK) and private claims of
commercial bank to GDP (BANK) decrease the volatility of the government bond yield
on housing.   This can be explained by the strong commitment of the Korean government
to supplying stable funds for new housing construction.  However, an increase in the
macroeconomic policy stance variable (VV) causes an increase in the volatility of the
government bond yield.  This finding is consistent with economic theory.  The impulse
response function of BOND is shown in Figures 6-A to 6-C.
When we move to the relative importance of financial structure on the
forecasting-error variance of the bond yield volatility, claims of the commercial bank to
the private sector (BANK) plays the most important role and stock market capitalization
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to GDP (MK) is plays the next most important role.  Innovation accounting of the
government bond yield on housing is given in Table 6-D.
V. Conclusions
This study tried to identify the role of financial structure on the volatility of
economic variables, the real effective exchange rate, the money-market rate, government
bond yield, and stock price.  We used the concept of market-based and bank-based
financial structure developed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) to investigate the
changing role of financial structure on the volatility of several economic variables.   From
this case study of Korea, it is difficult to say that our findings are unique.  However, some
of our more interesting findings, at least for Korea, are summarized in what follows.
It seems that there exists more than one long-run stable relationship between
financial structure and economic variables which are volatility of real effective exchange
rate, money market rate, stock price, and government bond yields on housing in Korea.
We also found that the dynamic impact of financial structure on the volatility of each
economic variable is asymmetric, i.e., some economic variable’s volatility increased
whereas other variable’s volatility decreased.  For the stock price volatility, increased
claims to private sector by commercial bank to GDP and stock market capitalization to
GDP both increase the volatility of the stock price.  This reflects the highly volatile
nature of stock prices, which is independent of Korea's financial structure.
For the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, claims to private sector by
commercial bank to GDP (BANK) increases volatility and government should monitor
closely the commercial bank’s activity in foreign exchange market for to avoid their
excessive risk exposure and destabilizing speculations.  However, stock market
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capitalization to GDP (MK) decreases the volatility of the real effective exchange rates
implying that as Korea’s financial structure moves from a bank-based to a market-based
system, the volatility of the real effective exchange rate decreased since mid-1980s even
with a more flexible exchange rate system and this is confirmed by Figure 2.
Since the exchange rate is determined (at least in the short run) by capital inflows
and outflows in the foreign-exchange market, this finding reflects the restrictions on
foreigners' ownership of domestic stock in Korea during the analysis period and the fact
that most of the capital flows are channeled through commercial banks.
For the volatility of the money-market interest rate, stock market capitalization to
GDP (MK) increases the volatility whereas increased claims to the private sector of
commercial banks to GDP (BANK) decreases the volatility of the money-market rate.
This implies that if interest targeting is the primary goal of policy authority, strong
supervision and monitoring is necessary in the stock market to stabilize the money-
market rate.  For the volatility of the government bond yield, both the claims to private
sector by commercial bank to GDP (BANK) and stock market capitalization to GDP
(MK) decrease the volatility of the yield on government bond on housing.  This explains
the intrinsic stability of the yield on government bond yield on housing.  The Korean
government's policy goal of stabilizing the house supply in Korea has successfully
isolated the housing market from the impact of financial structure.
This study identified a stable long-run relationship between financial structure and
volatility of financial variables in Korea  implying that stabilization policy should be
different depending on priority of the policy goals.  Future study will investigate whether
the findings of this study are robust with respect to different definitions of financial
structure and for different data sets, i.e., cross-country data.
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Data Appendix: Sources and Definitions
1. RX: real effective exchange rate of Korean won from JP Morgan.
2. BOND: government bond yield on housing  (IFS line 61).
3. STK: stock price index (IFS line 62).
4. MMR: money-market rate (IFS line 60b).
5. VRX: volatility of real effective exchange rate defined as a six-month window
standard deviation for each quarter; data are from JP Morgan.
6. VBOND: volatility of the government bond yield on housing defined as a six-month
window standard deviation for each quarter (IFS line 61).
7. VSTK: volatility of the stock price defined as a six-month window standard deviation
for each quarter (IFS line 62).
8. VMMR: volatility of the money-market rate defined as a six-month window standard
deviation for each quarter (IFS line 60b).
9. NBFI: Other financial institutions' domestic assets (IFS lines 42a-d) to GDP (IFS line
90 bp).
10. BANK: Commercial banks' domestic assets (IFS lines 22 a-d) to GDP (IFS line 90
bp).
11. MK: Stock market capitalization (Monthly Bulletin of the Stock Market) to GDP (IFS
line 90 bp).
12. VV: Macroeconomic Control Variable defined in the text.
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Table 1. Financial Market Composition of Korea*
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94
(1)Financial
Institutions
38.0 40.7 45.6 48.7 52.5
         Banks 29.2 26.2 23.2 20.3 19.2
         Non-Banks 8.8 14.5 22.4 28.4 33.2
(2)Security Market 11.1 15.6 20.0 27.1 27.0
         Stocks 9.7 11.1 11.9 16.4 11.4
         Bonds 1.3 4.5 8.1 10.7 15.6
(3) CP Market 0.5 1.4 3.2 4.7 4.0
(4) Foreign Market 13.6 13.3 6.0 0.2 2.2
(5) Other Finance 36.9 29.0 25.2 19.3 14.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: * denotes the non-financial sector’s fund raising
     CP denotes commercial paper
Source:  The Financial System in Korea (1995), Bank of Korea.
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           Table 2. Market Share of Financial Institutions in Korea
Loans (in percent) Deposits (in percent)
1980 1985 1990 1995* 1980 1985 1990 1995*
Dep. Money Bank** 63.3 58.4 48.3 42.9 68.4 53.5 41.0 32.4
                                                 -32.2%                                                  -52.6%
NBFIs *** 36.7 41.6 51.7 57.1 31.6 46.5 59.0 67.6
                                                  55.6%                                                 113.9%
A.Development 14.8 10.8 8.3 8.0 3.8 4.1 3.1 4.2
                                                -45.9%                                                  10.5%
B.Savings 13.0 16.3 25.3 33.3 13.5 15.5 27.1 36.5
                                                 152.6%                                                   170%
C.Investment 5.8 7.6 8.1 6.8 9.5 15.8 16.2 15.5
                                                   17.2%                                                      63%
D.LifeInsurance Co. 3.1 6.9 10.0 9.0 4.8 11.1 12.6 11.4
                                                190.3%                                                   137.5%
Notes: 1)* denotes the amount by the end of June, 1995
           2)** denotes money deposits at banks
           3)*** denotes Non-banking Financial Institutions
           4)% denotes the total growth rate between June 1980 and June 1995
Source:  The Financial System in Korea (1995), Bank of Korea.
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Table 3.   Tests of Unit Roots
A. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Variable Lags ADFτ ADFΖ Joint test of unit root and no constant
VRX 2 (1) -2.29 -10.7 4.0
VSTK 1 (1) -2.20 -9.16 2.45
VBOND 13 (1) -2.84 -8.2 4.07
VMMR 2 (1) -2.87 -6.8 4.12
NBVB  0 (0) 1.15 0.82 3.27
BANK 14 (1) -0.63 -0.87 2.29
MK 8 (8) -1.25 -3.07 1.23
Note: ** denotes that the estimate is significant at 5 percent critical level.
B.  Paco Goerlich Test
Variable AR Constant Trend Constant No constant, Conclusion
VRX 4 -1.29 -1.07 -1.12 Unit root, no drift
VSTK 4 -1.61 -1.73 -0.75 Unit root, no drift
VBOND 4 -2.90 -2.54 -1.09 Unit root, no drift
VMMR 4 -2.50 -2.38 -0.70 Unit root, no driftt
NBVB 4 -2.66 -0.12 N.A. Unit root, drift
BANK 4 -1.79 -1.03 1.61 Unit root, no drift
MK 4 -1.98 2.19 1.29 Unit root no drift
Note: ** denotes that the estimate is significant at 5 percent critical level.
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Table 4. Granger-Causality Test
         A. Volatility of Stock Price
VSTK NBFI BANK MK VV
VSTK .000** .38 .29 .67 .67
NBFI .07 .000** .045** .217 .520
BANK .780 .011** .000** .057 .042**
MK .009** .000** .490 .000** .230
VV .057 .063 .490 .250 .059
Notes: Figures are significance probabilities. ** denotes significant at 5 percent.
       B. Volatility of Real Effective Exchange Rate
VREX NBFI BANK MK VV
VREX .000** .14 .29 .25 .90
NBFI .65 .000** .001** .006** .035**
BANK .018** .000** .000** .000** .014**
MK .23 ..000** .75 .000** .35
VV .69 .23 .019** .63 .023**
       Notes: Figures are significance probabilities.  ** denotes significant at 5 percent.
       C. Volatility of Money-Market Rate
VMMR NBFI BANK MK VV
VMMR .000** .43 .078 .98 .29
NBFI .92 .000** .29 .12 .13
BANK .77 .0002** .000** .0007** .034**
MK .58 .000** .83 .0001** .26
VV .78 .22 .06 .63 .18
Notes: Figures are significance probabilities. ** denotes significant at 5 percent.
D. Volatility of Government Bond Yield
VBOND NBFI BANK MK VV
VBOND .000** .190 .056 .160 .620
NBFI .230 .000** .269 .435 .268
BANK .293 .002** .000** .006** .044**
MK .710 .000** .890 .000** .390
VV .200 .210 .066 .960 .030**
Notes: Figures are significance probabilities.  ** denotes significant at 5 percent.
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Table 5. Johansen’s Cointegration Test
A. Endogenous Series: VSTP, NBFI, BANK, MK, VV
Lags in the model: 4, No. of observations=65, No. of observations - no. of variables=45
Eigen-Value L-max Trace H0: r p-r L-max90 Trace90
0.8912 144.19** 208.74** 0 5 18.96 55.54
0.4919 44.01** 64.55** 1 4 15.00 36.58
0.2106 15.37** 20.54 2 3 11.23 21.58
0.0750 5.07 5.16 3 2 7.37 10.35
0.0014 0.09 0.09 4 1 2.98 2.98
Notes:  ** denotes significant at 10 percent.
Cointegrating Vector:
VSTP NBFI BANK MK VV
-.058 -1.644 12.225 0.662 0.018
-0.716 -2.739 19.046 0.789 0.089
B. Endogenous Series: VREX, NBFI, BANK, MK, VV
Lags in the model: 4, No. of observations=65, No. of observations - no. of variables=45
Eigen-Value L-max Trace H0: r p-r L-max90 Trace90
0.8804 138.03** 212.02** 0 5 18.96 55.54
0.4726 41.59** 73.99** 1 4 15.00 36.58
0.3126 24.37** 32.40** 2 3 11.23 21.58
0.1049 7.20 8.03 3 2 7.37 10.35
0.0127 0.83 0.83 4 1 2.98 2.98
Notes:  ** denotes significant at 10 percent.
Cointegrating Vector:
VREX NBFI BANK MK VV
0.024 2.052 -13.05 -0.723 0.151
0.496 5.429 -27.166 -1.250 -0.594
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Table 5. Johansen’s Cointegration Test (continued)
C. Endogenous Series: VMMR, NBFI, BANK, MK, VV
Lags in the model: 4, No. of observations = 65, No. of observations - no. of variables=45
Eigen-Value L-max Trace H0: r p-r L-max90 Trace90
0.8643 129.85** 184.80** 0 5 18.96 55.54
0.3376 26.78** 54.95** 1 4 15.00 36.58
0.2835 21.67** 28.17** 2 3 11.23 21.58
0.0761 5.15 6.51 3 2 7.37 10.35
0.0207 1.36 1.36 4 1 2.98 2.98
Notes:  ** denotes significant at 5 percent.
Cointegrating Vector:
VMMR NBFI BANK MK VV
-1.138 4.504 -25.846 -1.285 0.654
1.934 -7.608 44.483 2.425 0.492
D. Endogenous Series: VBOND, NBFI, BANK, MK, VV
Lags in the model: 4, No. of observations = 65, No. of observations - no. of variables=45
Eigen-Value L-max Trace H0: r p-r L-max90 Trace90
0.8864 141.36** 202.38** 0 5 18.96 55.54
0.3231 25.37** 61.02** 1 4 15.00 36.58
0.2968 22.89** 35.65** 2 3 11.23 21.58
0.1672 11.89** 12.76** 3 2 7.37 10.35
0.0132 0.87 0.87 4 1 2.98 2.98
Notes: ** denotes significant at 10 percent.
Cointegrating Vector:
VBOND NBFI BANK MK VV
-.226 2.543 -16.788 -.925 .188
.683 -1.287 9.604 0.655 0.895
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Table 6: Variance Decomposition of the VAR Model:
A. Decomposition of Volatility of Stock Price (VSTK)
Percentage of the forecast-error variance of VSTK explained by
quarters VSTK NBFI BANK MK VV
4 92.74 1.72 3.33 1.56 0.62
8 78.57 3.43 11.37 6.04 0.57
12 77.38 3.52 11.83 6.70 0.54
16 76.84 3.52 12.23 6.81 0.58
20 76.59 3.56 12.05 7.15 0.64
24 76.37 3.65 11.99 7.32 0.65
B. Decomposition of Volatility of Real Effective Exchange Rate (VREX)
Percentage of the forecast-error variance of VREX explained by
quarters VREX NBFI BANK MK VV
4 90.05 0.08 2.73 6.21 0.92
8 80.23 0.29 6.80 11.57 1.08
12 79.81 0.30 6.56 11.91 1.40
16 79.61 0.32 6.60 11.98 1.48
20 79.24 0.35 6.72 12.19 1.48
24 79.16 0.36 6.71 12.27 1.48
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Table 6: Variance Decomposition of the VAR Model (continued)
C. Decomposition of Volatility of  Money-Market Rate (MMR)
Percentage of the forecast-error variance of MMR explained by
quarters MMR NBFI BANK MK VV
4 85.10 0.07 13.76 0.04 1.01
8 76.49 0.19 17.67 1.53 4.09
12 69.75 0.45 15.91 9.91 3.95
16 63.60 0.55 14.43 17.82 3.58
20 60.38 0.57 14.25 21.33 3.45
24 59.62 0.60 14.69 21.60 3.47
D. Decomposition of Volatility of Government Bond Yield (BOND)
Percentage of the forecast-error variance of BOND explained by
quarters BOND NBFI BANK MK VV
4 82.04 0.45 14.31 0.79 2.39
8 68.84 0.94 20.39 6.52 3.28
12 66.48 10.7 22.26 6.96 3.21
16 64.46 1.10 22.21 9.09 3.12
20 61.01 1.04 20.97 14.01 2.95
24 58.06 1.04 20.39 17.67 2.82
Figure 1. Financial Structure of 
Korea
0
1
2
3
1973:01 1978:03 1984:01 1989:03 1995:01
Time
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 b
y 
G
D
P
NBFI
BOND
STOCK
BANK
1Figure 2. Volatility of Financial 
Variables
0
10
20
30
40
1971:04 1978:01 1984:02 1990:03 1996:04S
ta
nd
ar
d 
D
ev
ia
tio
ns
VSTK
VBOND
VMMR
VREX
2Figure 3. Cumulative Impulse Response Functions of Stock Price Volatility
 A. Shock of Non-Bank Assets
B. Shock of Market Capitalization (MK)
C. Shock of Bank Assets
Cumulative Impulse Response of VSTK to 
MK
0
2
4
6
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
Cumulative Impulse Response of VSTK to 
BANK
0
5
10
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
Cumulative Impulse Response of 
VSTK to NBFI
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
3Figure 4. Cumulative Impulse Response Functions of REER Volatility
A. Shocks to Non-Bank Financial Institutions' Assets
B. Shocks of Market Capitalizations
C. Shocks of Bank Assets
Cumulative Impulse Response of VREX to 
NBFI
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
Cumulative Impulse Response of 
VREX to MK
-2
-1
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
Cumulative Impulse Response of VREX to 
BANK
0
1
2
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
4Figure 5. Cumulative Impulse Response Functions of Money-Market Rate (MMR)
 A. Shock of Non-Bank Assets
B. Shock of Market Capitalization (MK)
C. Shock of Bank Assets
Cumulative Impulse Response of VMMR to 
NBFI
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
Cumulative Impulse Response of VMMR to 
MK
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
Cumulative Impulse Response of 
VMMR to BANK
-1
-0.5
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
5Figure 6. Cumulative Impulse Response Functions of Bond Yield Volatility
A. Shocks of Non-Bank Financial Institutions' Assets
B. Shocks of Market Capitalizations
C. Shocks of Bank Assets
Cumulative Impulse Response of VBOND to 
NBFI
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
Cumulative Impulse Response of VBOND to 
MK
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
Cumulative Impulse Response of 
VMMR to BANK
-1
-0.5
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Quarters
